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COMMENTS
Standing To Appeal Zoning Determinations: The
"Aggrieved Person" Requirement
During the twentieth century the states have increasingly utilized their police power to control the use of land. 1 All fifty states
have now enacted zoning enabling legislation,2 much of which is
based in whole or in part on the Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act. 3 Typically, these zoning acts, iike the Standard Act, empower
municipalities4 to promulgate land use regulations by dividing the
municipality "into districts of such number, shape, and area as may
be deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of this act ... ,"Ii
Most zoning acts specify that "all such regulations shall be uniform
for each class or kind of buildings throughout each district, but the
regulations in one district may differ from those in 'other districts." 0
Despite the desire for uniform land regulation, however, a number of "safety valves" have been incorporated into zoning procedures
to provide for necessary diversity and to ensure fairness in the
implementation of zoning regulations. 7 One of the most important
of these is the "board of_adjustment," 8 which has the power to grant
1. See, e,g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 2'12 U.S. 365 (1926); City of
Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 84, 149 N.E. '784 (1925); cf. Brandon v. Board of Comm'rs, 124
N.J.L. 135, 142-43, 11 A.2d 304, 309 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 125 N.J.L. 36'7, 15 A.2d 598 (Ct,
Err. &: App. 1940).
2. See Cunningham, Land-Use Control-The State and Local Programs, 50 IOWA L.
REv. 36'7, 369 n.3 (1965).
3. The STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING Am: (hereinafter cited as STANDARD Acr)
was sponsored by the United States Department of Commerce. Originally published in
1924, it is now out of print, but is reproduced at 3 RATHKOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING
100-1 to -6 (3d ed. 1956).
4. Over half the states also authorize counties or townships to enact zoning regula•
tions. See, e.g., MICH, CoMP. LAws §§ 125.201-.232, 125.2'11-.301 (1948), as amended,
MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 125.201-.218, 125.2'72-.298 (Supp. 1961).
5. STANDARD Acr § 2. See, e,g., ALAsKA STAT, ANN. § 29.10.219 (1962); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 414.2 (1949).
6. STANDARD Act § 2. (Emphasis added.) See, e,g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-461C
(1956); KY. REv. STAT.§ 100.06'7(2) (1962).
'l. See V. F. Zahodiakin Eng'r Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 8 N.J. 386, 86
A.2d 12'1 (1952); Guenther v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 85 R.I. 3'7, 125 A,2d 214 (1956);
Azalea Corp. v. City of Richmond, 201 Va. 636, II2 S.E.2d 862 (1960).
8. See STANDARD Am: § 7; ARK. STAT. ANN, § 19-2816 (1956); GA. CODE ANN. § 69-815
(1957). Some statutes refer to this body as the Board of Appeals. See Van Auken
v. Kimmey, 141 Misc. 105, 252 N.Y.S. 329 (Sup. Ct. 1930). Others title it the Zoning
Board of Review. See Buckminster v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 69 R.I. 396, 33 A.2d 199
(1943).
For the general functions of such boards, see 2 RATHKOPF, op. cit. supra note 3, at
3'7-1 to -12. See also Anderson, The Board of Zoning Appeals-Villain or Victim1, 13
SYRACUSE L. REv. 353 (1962); Dukeminier &: Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment:
A Case Study in Misrule, 50 KY. L.J. 273 (1962); McSwain, The Zoning Board of
Adjustment, 13 BAYLOR L. REv. 21 (1961); Souter, Zoning Appeals-How a Board of
Zoning Appeals Functions, Mich. S.B.J., May 1961, p. 26.
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such "variance from the terms of the ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest, where, owing to special conditions, a
literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will result
in unnecessary hardship, and so that the spirit of the ordinance shall
be observed and substantial justice done.'' 9 Moreover, in appropriate
cases the board may make special exceptions to the terms of a zoning
ordinance.10
Before an individual can obtain a variance or special exception,
he must first apply for a permit from a building inspector to undertake the desired action. Since the building inspector has no power
to grant a variance, this preliminary requirement appears unnecessary when it is clear that the contemplated use is outside the standards
of the ordinance; the inspector can issue a permit only if he finds
that the contemplated land use is in fact permitted by the terms of
the ordinance. 11
If the building permit is denied for any reason, the applicant
generally has the right to appeal to the board of adjustment as a
"person aggrieved ... by any decision of the administrative officer.'' 12
The board is then required to hold hearings on the denial of the
permit and to determine whether a variance should be granted.
If the requested variance is denied by the board, the applicant
may appeal, as a person aggrieved, to a proper court. 13 On the
other hand, if the variance is granted by the board, third parties may qualify as persons aggrieved and may litigate the issue
in court. 14 "Aggrieved person," however, is not defined by the
statutes. Consequently, it has been left to the courts to delineate
the standards which govern the status of an applicant or a third party
as an aggrieved person entitled to appeal. It is the purpose of this
discussion to examine the requirements for applicants and for third
parties to have standing as persons aggrieved by decisions of the
9. E.g., STANDARD Acr § 7; NEV. REV. STAT. § 278.290(l)(C) (1963). In some states the
power to grant variances may be given to the local governing body. See Dallstream and
Hunt, Variations, Exceptions and Spedal Uses, 1954- U. ILL. L.F. 213.
10. E.g., STANDARD Acr § 7; TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-706 (1955). For the distinction
between a variance and an exception or a special use permit, see Devereux Foundation, Inc., 351 Pa. 4-78, 483-86, 200 Atl. !H7, 521 (1945). ·
11. See, e.g., City of Yuba City v. Chemivasky, 117 Cal. App. 568, 4 P.2d 299 (1931);
Jennings v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 140 Conn. 650, 103 A.2d 535 (1954); Boardwalk & Seashore Corp. v. Murdock, 175 Misc. 208, 22 N.Y.S.2d 611 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
12. STANDARD Acr § 7. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 176.11 (194-3); N.Y. VILLAGE LAw
§ 179-b. A number of statutes specifically provide for an appeal to the board by "any
person aggrieved by his inability to obtain a building permit." E.g., NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 278.310(l)(a) (1931); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 5230 (1956). Thus, in most states, appeals to the board are generally based on the refusal of a building inspector to issue
a permit. See Kelley v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 126 Conn. 648, 650, 13 A.2d 675,
676 (1940).
13. See, e.g., STANDARD Acr § 7; N.Y. VILLAGE LAw § 179-b.
14. See STANDARD Acr § 7.

1072

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 64:1070

administrative officer and the board of adjustment,15 and to consider
the validity of some of the factors that have been emphasized by the
courts in-resolving the issue.
I. PERMIT .APPLICANTS AS AGGRIEVED PERSONS
In general, the courts have not provided meaningful indicia
as to the degree or kind of interest that an applicant must have to
qualify as an aggrieved person. This judicial vagueness can be
attributed in part to the fact that variance appeals are generally
concerned solely with the basis of the denial; the standing of the
appellants is assumed to be proper. When the standing issue is
raised, however, it appears that two principal factors are relied
upon to determine whether an applicant is a person aggrieved.
First, the appellant must show some substantial legal or equitable
incident of "ownership" in the property in question; second, he must
show a significant economic interest in the outcome of the variance
proceeding.16
In a majority of the decisions, it is the "legal or equitable interest"
factor that has received primary consideration. In fact, most courts
have held that even though a substantial economic interest is manifest, a party lacking a cognizable legal interest cannot be considered
"aggrieved."17 It would seem, however, that economic factors should
be given greater stress, especially in circumstances where the legal
or equitable interest in the property is slight but the outcome of
the litigation may have substantial economic effects. On the other
hand, if a person has no interest in the property, he will not and
should not be granted status as an aggrieved party.18
The effect of the two factors-legal and economic-<:an best be
illustrated by a consideration of the various situations in which an
applicant may become an aggrieved party. The problem arises, of
course, when the possessor of some interest in the property in question applies for a permit or a variance and it is denied.19
15. The requirements for being aggrieved by decisions of the zoning board of
adjustment or by the zoning officer overlap with, but are not identical to, the requirements for being aggrieved by local legislative action through enactment or amendment
of the ordinance. The latter issue is not dealt with as such by this discussion, although
the question is present in a few of the cases cited.
16. A few courts, however, adopt neither a legal nor an economic analysis. Instead,
any applicant who is refused a permit is automatically "aggrieved." See Smith v. Sel•
ligman, 270 Ky. 69, 109 S.W.2d 14 (1937); Buckminster v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 68
R.I. 515, 30 A.2d 104 (1943).
17. See, e.g., Chad Homes, Inc. v. Board of Appeals, 5 Misc. 2d 20, 159 N.Y.S.2d 388
(Sup. Ct. !957); Kumowski v. Boar~ of Zoning Appeals, 53 Lack, Jur. 53 (Pa. C.P. 1952).
18. Krieger v, Scott, 4 N.J. Misc. 942, 134 Atl. 901 (Sup. Ct. 1926) (per curiam);
Dimitri v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 61 RJ. 325, 200 Atl. 963 (1938).
19. It is possible for an applicant to become aggrieved upon the approval of a
variance. This occurs when the board grants the variance but attaches objectionable
conditions. See Rand v. City of New York, 3 Misc. 2d 769, 155 N.Y.S.2d 753 (Sup. Ct.
1956).
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A. Property Owners
One who owns property outright and is denied a permit or
variance clearly has standing to appeal, since fee ownership carries
with it the highest degree of both legal and economic implications.
Indeed, the rule granting a property owner standing is so well
established that few direct statements have been enunciated on this
point. The major support for the rule comes from decisions that a
person is a property owner and an aggrieved party,20 or inferentially
from cases allowing appeals by an agent of the owner or by a prospective vendee. 21 For example, in Dunham v. Zoning Bd.22 the court
ruled that it was unnecessary to decide whether a conditional vendee
had a sufficient interest in the property to apply for a special exception, since "the application in question was also made, signed and
prosecuted personally before the board by the owner of the land
whose right under the ordinance to apply for such an exception is
not questioned." 23
B. Agents of Property Owner
An application of ordinary rules of agency would seem to require
that an agent be held to possess, for the purpose of determining
standing, whatever interest his principal has in the property. Although few courts have ruled directly on the question, it seems clear
that an agent of the fee owner may be an aggrieved party. For
example, it has been held that a construction company24 or an
architect25 may appeal in the capacity of "agent for the owner," and
other courts have viewed successors in interest during the pendency
of the application26 or conditional vendees27 as persons aggrieved.
Generally, the courts have found the requisite interests on the
theory that the party in question is an implied agent of the
owner. Furthermore, at least one court has held a "straw man"
to be a person aggrieved, on the theory that he was a fiduciary for
the true owner.28 It would appear, therefore, that standing to appeal
should be granted to an agent whenever his principal, whether
or not he is the outright owner of the property, could himself
qualify as an aggrieved party.
20. See, e.g., Scholl v. Yeadon .Borough, 148 Pa. Super. 601, 26 A.2d 135 (1942).
21. See cases cited notes 24-28, 34-41 infra.
22. 68 R.I. 88, 26 A.2d 614 (1942).
23. Id. at 92, 26 A.2d at 616.
24. Stout v. Jenkins, 268 S.W.2d 643 (Ky. 1954).
25. Protomastro v• .Board of Adjustment, 3 N.J. Super. 539, 67 A.2d 231 (Super. Ct.
L. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 3 N.J. 494, 70 A.2d 873 (1950).
26. Feneck v. Murdock, 16 Misc. 2d 789, 181 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
27. Arant v. .Board of Adjustment, 271 Ala. 600, 126 So. 2d 100 (1960); Slater
v. Toohill, 276 App. Div. 850, 93 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1949) (memorandum decision); Hickox
v. Griffin, 274 App. Div. 792, 79 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1948), rev'd on other grounds, 298 N.Y.
365, 83 N.E.2d 836 (1949).
·
28. Dion v• .Board of Appeals, 344 Mass. 547, 183 N.E.2d 479 (1962).

1074

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, 64:1070

C. Lessees

In Nicholson v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,29 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court pointed out that a tenant occupies "a status which
permits him to apply for a variance and ... he is a 'party aggrieved'
within the meaning of that term as used in the Enabling Acts and
ordinances enacted pursuant to them."80 The implication of the
Nicholson case is that a tenant or lessee always has sufficient economic and legal interests in the property to qualify as an aggrieved
party. While Nicholson represents the majority view,81 a few cases
have come to the contrary conclusion. Thus, it has been held that
if a lessee's interest is based on an oral lease,82 or a tenancy at will, 33
he cannot be granted standing. The validity of such distinctions is
doubtful, because the degree of legal interest in a leasehold is the
same regardless of whether it is based upon an oral contract, a written
contract, a tenancy at will, or a tenancy for a definite period. Moreover, the economic interest in the leasehold does not depend upon
the type of contract employed. Even where the lessee under an
oral lease is viewed as holding a de minimis legal property interest,
it does not necessarily follow that he has an insubstantial economic
interest in the property. Consequently, if substantial fairness is to be
maintained in the administration of zoning regulations, it would
seem better to allow a tenant to appeal an adverse ruling whenever
he has an overriding economic interest in the outcome of the variance application. Thus, the length of the unexpired term of the
lease should be considered as a factor, although not a conclusive
one, in the determination of the lessee's standing. As a result, even
a written lease might not support the lessee's standing to appeal if
it had only a short time to run and no renewal option. ·
D. Contract Vendees
The courts have had difficulty in determining whether a purchaser under a contract should be granted status as an aggrieved
person. In general, it appears that the judiciary will not look through
the form of the contract to examine the real interests involved in
the appeal. If the contract is unconditional, the vendee will be
29. 392 Pa. 278, 140 A.2d 604 (1958).
30. Id. at 282, 140 A.2d at 606.
31. See, e.g., Poster Advenising Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 408 Pa. 248, 182
A.2d 521 (1962); Richman v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 391 Pa. 254, 137 A.2d 280
(1958); Ralston Purina Co. v. Zoning Bd., 64 R.I. 197, 12 A.2d 219 (1940).
A cotenant may attack the validity of a zoning ordinance in his own behalf. Jones
v. Incorporated Village of Lloyd Harbor, 277 App. Div. 1124, 100 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1950),
afj'd mem., 302 N.Y. 718, 98 N.E.2d 589 (1951).
32. In re McLaughlin, 42 Del. Co. 388 (Pa. C.P. 1955). See also Bloom v. Wides,
164 Ohio St. 138, 128 N.E.2d 31 (1955).
33. Gallagher v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 186 A.2d 325 (R.I. 1962), See also City of
Little Rock v. Goodman, 222 Ark. 350, 260 S.W.2d 450 (1953).
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granted standing.34 When the contract is conditioned upon the securing of a zoning variance or exception, however, the purchaser's
qualifications are not as clear. In the majority of cases the courts have
allowed such a purchaser to apply for a permit and to appeal a denial
thereof as an aggrieved party. 35 Normally, this result is reached by
regarding the conditional vendee as the agent or assignee of the
owner,36 or as an equitable owner.31 On the other hand, a few courts
have impliedly dropped the "legal or equitable interest" analysis
and have held that a conditional vendee has a sufficient personal
economic interest in the property to support his standing to appeal. 38
For example, the Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that "it is enough
that an application was made for a permit to use this property for a
filling station, by one having a contingent interest in using the
property for that purpose . . . ." 39 In addition, several courts have
used the fact that the owner joined in the application40 or gave his
consent and approval41 as a makeweight for allowing the conditional
purchaser to appeal as a person aggrieved.
In a few decisions the contract vendee has been denied standing
as an aggrieved party because he did not have a sufficient present
interest in the property to enable him to seek a use change in the
34. See, e.g., Goldreyer v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 144 Conn. 641, 136 A.2d 789
(1957); Sigretto v• .Board of Adjustment, 134 N.J.L. 587, 50 A.2d 492 (Sup. Ct. 1946);
Mandalay Constr., Inc. v. Zimmer, 22 Misc. 2d 543, 194 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1959);
Henry Norman Associates, Inc. v. Ketler, 16 Misc. 2d 764, 183 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Sup. Ct.
1959); Elkins Park Improvement Ass'n Zoning Case, 361 Pa. 322, 64 A.2d 783 (1949);
Scheer v. Weis, 13 Wis. 2d 408, 108 N.W.2d 523 (1961).
35. E.g., Arant v. Board of Adjustment, 271 Ala. 600, 126 So. 2d 100 (1960); Reiskin
v. County Council, 229 Md. 142, 182 A.2d 34 (1962); City of Baltimore v. Cohn, 204 Md.
523, 105 A.2d 482 (1954); Burr v. Keene, 105 N.H. 228, 196 A.2d 63 (1963).
36. Arant v. Board of Adjustment, 271 Ala. 600, 126 So. 2d 100 (1960); Wilson
v. Township Comm., 123 N.J.L. 474, 9 A.2d 771 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Hickox v. Griffin, 274
App. Div. 792, 79 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1948), rev'd on other grounds, 298 N.Y. 365, 83 N.E.2d
836 (1949); Colony Park, Inc. v. Malone, 25 Misc. 2d 1072, 205 N.Y.S.2d 166 (Sup. Ct.
1960); State ex rel. Waltz v. Independence, 69 Ohio L. Abs. 445, 125 N.E.2d 911 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1952).
37. Hickox v. Griffin, supra note 36; O'Neill v. Philadelphia Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 384 Pa. 379, 120 A.2d 901 (1956); Silverco, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
379 Pa. 497, 109 A.2d 147 (1954).
38. E.g., City of Baltimore v. Cohn, 204 Md. 523, 105 A.2d 482 (1954); Carson
v. Board of Appeals, 321 Mass. 649, 75 N.E.2d II6 (1947); Colony Park, Inc. v. Malone,
25 Misc. 2d 1072, 205 N.Y.S.2d 166 (Sup. Ct. 1960); State ex rel. Sun Oil Co. v. City
of Euclid, 164 Ohio St. 265, 130 N.E.2d 336 (1955), see State ex rel. River Grove Park,
Inc. v. City of Kettering, II8 Ohio App. 143, 193 N.E.2d 547 (1962).
39. State ex rel. Sun Oil Co. v. City of Euclid, supra note 38, at 269, 130 N.E.2d
at 339.
40. Marinelli v: Board of Appeal of the Bldg. Dep't, 275 Mass. 169, 175 N.E. 479
(1931); Colt v. Bernard, 279 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955); Jersey Triangle Corp.
v. Board of Adjustment, 127 N.J.L. 194, 21 A.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 1941); State ex rel. Sun
Oil Co. v. City of Euclid, 164 Ohio St. 265, 130 N.E.2d 336 (1955).
41. Wilson v. Township Comm., 123 N.JL. 474, 9 A.2d 771 (Sup. Ct. 1939);
Slamowitz v. Jelleme, 3 N.J. Misc. II69, 130 Atl. 833 (Sup. Ct. 1925); Stoll v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 79 Ohio L. Abs. 145, 155 N.E.2d 83 (C.P. 1958); Elvan v. Exley, 58 Pa.
D. &: C. 538 (C.P. 1947).
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first place; therefore, he could not be aggrieved by the denial of an
application.42 In addition, some courts which would othenvise grant
the applicant the status of an appellant distinguish between variance
applicants and persons applying for other types of permits. Since
many statutes require an applicant for a variance to show "unnecessary hardship," 43 it has been reasoned that a vendee who knowingly
acquires land with the expectation of using it for a prohibited purpose cannot thereafter apply for a variance, because his 'hardship is
self~inflicted.44 However, reliance on this distinction seems unwarranted. In the first place, the question of unnecessary hardship should
not even arise until the merits of the variance application are reached.
Second, since the owner-vendor clearly has standing as an aggrieved
party, his vendee should also be entitled to aggrieved-party status. In
effect, the vendee should be considered as having purchased this important right as a part of the normal incidents of property ownership.
A few courts have impliedly adopted this position.415
E. Option Holders
Many jurisdictions view the holder of an option to purchase as
having a mere right of choice granted by his option rather than a
present legal interest in the property.46 Consequently, the optionee
of property for which a variance or other use permit is sought and
refused is generally not regarded as an aggrieved party.47 However,
some courts, adopting what appears to be the better reasoning, 48
make no distinction between an optionee and a vendee whose contract is conditioned upon the securing of a variance. Since each is
considered to be acting at least impliedly on behalf of the owner,
42. E.g., Symonds v. Bucklin, 197 ,F. Supp. 682 (D. Md. 1961); MinQ.cy v. City of
Azusa, 164 Cal. App. 2d 12, 330 P.2d 255 (1958), appeal dismissed, 359 U.S. 486 (1959);
see Clark Oil &: Ref. Corp. v. City of Evanston, 23 Ill. 2d 48, 177 N.E.2d 191 (1961).
Compare Sun Oil Co. v. Macauley, '72 R.I. 206, 49 A.2d 917 (1946), with State ex rel.
River Grove Park, Inc. v. City of Kettering, 118 Ohio App. 143, 193 N.E.2d 547 (1962).
43. See, e.g., STANDARD Am: § 7; KY. REv. STAT• .ANN. § 100.076 (1962) (cxccp•
tional situations or conditions); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 179-b.
44. See Clark v. :Board of Zoning Appeals, 301 N.Y. 86, 92 N.E.2d 903 (1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 933 (1951); People ex rel. Fordham Manor Reformed Church v. Walsh,
244 N.Y. 280, 155 N.E. 575 (1927); MCJ.'lichol v. Gallagher, ~ Pa. D. &: C. 338 (C.P. 1948).
45. See, e.g., Slater v. Toohill, 276 App. Div. 850, 93 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1949) (memo•
randum decision); Hickox v. Griffin, 274 App. Div. 972, 79 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1948), rev'd
on other grounds, 298 N.Y. 365, 83 N.E.2d 836 (1949). Sec also Gray v. Board of
Supervisors, 154 Cal. App. 2d 700, 316 P.2d 678 (1957) (permit for church erection);
City of Baltimore v. Cohn, 204 Md. 523, 105 A.2d 482 (1954) (special exception);
O'Neill v. Philadelphia Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 384 Pa. 379, 120 A.2d 901 '(1956)
(permit for dancing school).
46. Lee v. Board of Adjustment, 226 N.C. 107, 37 S.E,2d 128 (1946); sec Parise
v. Zoning Bd, of Review, 92 R.I. 338, 168 A.2d 476 (1961).
47. See, e.g., Parise v. Zoning Bd. of Review, supra note 46; Tripp v. Zoning Dd,
of Review, 84 R.I. 262, 123 A.2d 144 (1956). See also First Nat'l Bank &: Trust Co.
v. City of Evanston, 53 Ill. App. 2d 321, 203 N.E.2d 6 (1964).
48. See 2 RATHKOl'F, op. cit. supra note 3, at 40-6.
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both qualify as aggrieved parties whenever the owner could so
qualify. 49 In any case, the decisions on point all indicate that if the
legal owner joins in the original application, the holder of an option
on the property will be allowed to appeal from a denial of the
application.50
F. Others
51
As previously stated, if both the legal and economic interests
of a person in the property in question are lacking or ambiguous,
standing to appeal as an aggrieved party will generally be denied.
The courts vary, however, in the strictness of their attitude toward
the requirement of the presence of both factors. Standing to appeal
has been refused, for example, when an airplane club applied for a
variance to permit the operation of an airfield on property in which
it had no title or interest, 52 and when a theatrical group sought a
variance for land on which it merely intended to submit a bid.53
Apparently, courts denying standing to appeal in such situations require the prospective appellant to have not only an economic interest in the property but also a legal or equitable interest.
On the other hand, a few courts seem to have placed less weight
on the property interest and have relied more extensively on economic considerations. For instance, in one case an insurance company was allowed to appeal to the board from a denial of a repair
permit to the owner, where the building had been damaged and
the denial of the permit made th~ insurer liable for a constructive
total loss.54 Looking at the economic impact upon the insurance
company of the denial of the repair permit, the court held that a"
decision which had the effect of increasing the company's liability
qualified it as an aggrieved party. 55 Another recent decision allowed
a non-owner to apply for rezoning of a lot upon which he intended
to construct an office building.5 6
49. See Babitzke v. Village of Harvester, 32 Ill. App. 2d 289, 177 N.E.2d 644 (1961);
Hatch v. Fiscal Court, 242 S.W.2d 1018 (Ky. 1961); Smith v. Selligman, 270 Ky. 69,
109 S.W.2d 14 (1937). But see Arant v. Board of Adjustment, 271 Ala. 600, 126 So. 2d
100 (1960); Conery v. City of Nashua, 103 N.H. 16, 164 A.2d 247 (1960).
50. See, e.g., Cranston Jewish Center v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 93 R.I. 364, 175 A.2d
296 (1961); Dunham v. Zoning Bd., 68 R.I. 88, 26 A.2d 438 (1942): cf. Hickerson
v. Flannery, 42 Tenn. App. 329, 302 S.W.2d 508 (1956).
51. See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
52. Underhill v. Board of Appeals, 17 Misc. 2d 257, 72 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 273 App. Div. 788, 75 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1947), aff'd mem., 297 N.Y. 937, 80 N.E.2d
342 (1948).
53. Schaeffer Appeal, 7 Pa. D. &: C.2d 468 (C.P. 1956).
54. State ex rel. Home Ins. Co. v. Burt, 23 Wis. 2d 231, 127 N.W.2d 270 (1964).
55. "Under the facts of the instant action, the insurers stand to lose over $21,000
as a result of the ruling of the board, which has the effect of turning a $6,337.04
partial loss into a constructive total loss, requiring the insurers to pay $28,000, the full
amount of the policies. The city's contentions on this point are without merit, for the
insurance companies are clearly 'persons aggrieved' ••••" Id. at 238, 127 N.W.2d at 273.
56. Binford v. Western Elec. Co., 219 Ga. 404, 133 S.E.2d 361 (1963).
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In the majority of cases, however, the courts will still strive to
find some legal or equitable interest even when there are compelling
economic considerations in the particular circumstances of the case.
Thus, standing to appeal has been granted where it appears, other
than from the record, that the appellant already is or intends to become the owner of the property. 57 Moreover, if the owner originally
joined in the application, an appeal may be allowed by a person
who could not himself qualify as aggrieved.58 In Feneck v. Murdock/19
for example, a corporation which had applied for a variance was
subsequently dissolved pending the hearing before the board. Nevertheless, the principal stockholders were allowed to continue the
application.60
It would appear, therefore, that many courts have accorded
"aggrieved party" status to individuals who would not normally be
regarded as possessing substantial attributes of a legal interest in the
property in question. However, it is incumbent upon the appealing
party to plead the special facts of his particular situation if he is
not the legal owner of the property involved in the application.
II.

THIRD PARTIES AS PERSONS AGGRIEVED

When a board of adjustment grants a variance, the applicant generally would have no reason to appeal to a court. 61 However, the
result may be objectionable to persons other than the applicant.
Third parties will be permitted to appeal to the courts as persons
aggrieved62 if they can "show that ... [their] property will suffer
some special damages as a result of the decision of the board complained of, which is not common to other property owners similarly
57. See, e.g., Board of Zoning Appeals v. Moyer, 108 Ind. App. 198, 'l!1 N.E.2d 905
(1940); Tramonti v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 93 Rl. 131, 172 A,2d 93 (1961).
58. See Marinelli v. Board of Appeal of the Bldg. Dep't, 275 Mass. 169, 175 N.E.
479 (1931) (conditional vendee); Jersey Triangle Corp. v. Board of Adjustment, 127
N.J.L. 194, 21 A.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (conditional vendee); cf. Taxpayers' Ass'n
v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 301 N.Y. 215, 93 N.E.2d 645 (1950) (property owners'
association).
59. 16 Misc. 2d 789, 181 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
60. The corporation was held to be the agent of its stockholders; when it applied
for a variance and conveyed the land to its principals, the variance ran with the land,
See id. at 792, 181 N.Y.S.2d at 445.
61. Cf. note 19 supra.
62. Many courts define persons aggrieved as including landowners or residents
who are adversely affected. E.g., Jackson's Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 21 Conn.
Supp. 102, 145 A.2d 241 (C.P. 1958). The breadth of the statutes varies. E.g., KY, REV,
STAT. ANN. § 100.480 (1962) ("any property owner or tenant'') (cities of 20,000·100,000
population), § 100.872 ("any person, firm, corporation, organization'') (cities of under
20,000 population). In Illinois, any property owner not given notice of a variance proceeding may appeal if he lives within 250 feet of the property in question, ILL, ANN,
STAT. ch. 24, § 11-13-7 (Smith-Hurd 1962). Many statutes also allow any taxpayer to
appeal. For the limited effect given some of these provisions, see text accompanying
notes 102·11 infra.
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situated." 68 Like the standards for an applicant to qualify as a person
aggrieved, the standards for third parties have never been clearly
specified. However, it appears that the courts attempt to justify
the standing of third parties as a necessary counterbalance to
the standing of applicants. 64 Since zoning statutes almost uniformly provide for the inclusion of the general public in hearings
before the board, 65 it seems logical to assume that these same parties
should, in some instances, be allowed to have their positions heard
before a court. Although courts often speak of individual loss as a
necessary prerequisite to a third party's standing to appeal as a person ·
aggrieved, the actual test employed seems to vary from case to case.

A. Near by Property Owners
A nearby landowner normally has standing as an aggrieved person.
In fact, one commentator has referred to such property owners as
private attorneys general asserting the public interest. 66 If the property owner's land abuts the land in question, the mere fact of proximity, without further proof of special damage, has often been
sufficient to support his appeal. 67 I£ he does not abut, however, the
requirements for standing may be more stringent. 68 It appears that
a non-abutting property owner must allege both proximity and
special damage for prima fade status as an aggrieved person. 69 To
satisfy the "special damage" element, the third-party appellant must
suffer some injury peculiar to his own property ·or more substantial
63. Victoria Corp. v. Atlanta Merchandise Mart, Inc., 101 Ga. App. 163, 112 S.E.2d
793, 795 (1960); see Downey v. Incorporated Village of Ardsley, 152 N.Y.S.2d 195
(Sup. Ct. 1956), afl'd mem., 3 App. Div. 2d 663, 158 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1957).
64. See generally Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development: A Challenge to Established Theory and Practice of Land Use Control, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 47, 55-63 (1965);
cf. BASSEIT, ZONING 154 (1940).
65. STANDARD Ac:r § 7: "All meetings of the board shall be open to the public." See,
e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 407 (1959); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-8 (1953).
66. See Krasnowiecki, supra note 64, at 60.
67. See, e.g., Heady v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 139 Conn. 463, 94 A.2d 789 (1953);
Elwyn v. City of Miami, 113 So. 2d 849 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Hemreich v. Quinn,
350 Mo. 770, 168 S.W.2d 1054 (1943); Lynch v. Borough of Hillsdale, 136 N.J.L. 129,
54 A.2d 723 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd per curiam, 137 N.J.L. 280, 59 A.2d 622 (Ct. Err.
&: App. 1948). But cf. Barnathan v. Garden City Park Water Dist., 21 App. Div. 2d
832, 251 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1964).
68. See Heady v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, supra note 67; Call Bond & Mortgage Co.
v. City of Sioux City, 219 Iowa 572, 259 N.W. 33 (1935); Wright v. DeFatta, 244 La.
251, 152 So. 2d 10 (1963); Toomey v. Gomeringer, 235 Md. 456, 201 A.2d 842 (1964);
Spaulding v. Board of Appeals, 334 Mass. 688, 138 N.E.2d 367 (1956); Gerling v. Board .
of Zoning Appeals, II Misc. 2d 84, 167 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Graves v. Johnson,
75 S.D. 261, 63 N.W.2d 341 (1954).
69. See Treadway v. City of Rockford, 24 Ill. 2d 488, 182 N.E.2d 219 (1962); Malena
v. Commerdinger, 233 N.Y.S.2d 549 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Balsam v. Jagger, 231 N.Y.S.2d 450
(Sup. Ct. 1962); cf. Wright v. DeFatta, supra note 68, at 264-65, 152 So. 2d at 15, where
the damage alleged was a depreciation in value, "droves of kids,'' and "Negroes loafing
on the streets."
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than that suffered by the community at large.7° For example, an
increase in traffic as a result of the variance would generally affect
all owners similarly situated. Under these circumstances, an individual would be "aggrieved" only if he could show that his property,
or his property and that of his immediate neighbors, suffered injuries more substantial than those suffered by the general public.71
Thus, standing will be denied to non-abutting third parties whose
injury is deemed to be de minimis because the property is too far
away from the land for which a variance has been granted,72 or if
the injury suffered is identical to that suffered by the general
community.
B. Nonresidents
Most courts have held that nonresidents cannot challenge zoning
regulations,73 even if their property is adjacent to the questione.d
zoning.74 For this reason, it has generally been assumed that a third
party must reside or own property within the particular community
to qualify as an aggrieved person.75 Despite this authority, however,
recent decisions appear to indicate a trend in favor of allowing nonresidents to attack the enactment76 and application77 of zoning ordinances and decisions within the neighboring municipality.
The Standard Act provides that zoning regulations "shall be made
in accordance with a comprehensive plan," 78 and the majority of
current state zoning enabling acts retain this language.70 Since rural
residence in the United States is declining, 80 it has become apparent
70. See S.A. Lynch Inv. Corp. v. City of Miami, 151 So. 2d 858 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1963); Adams v. The Mayor, 107 N.J.L. 149, 151 Atl. 863 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1930); Schultze
v. Wilson, 54 N.J. Super. 309, 148 A.2d 852 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959); Moore
v. Burchell, 14 App. Div. 2d 572, 218 N.Y.S.2d 868, appeal denied, 10 N.Y.2d 709, 179
N.E.2d 716, 223 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1961).
71. See Victoria Corp. v. Atlanta Merchandise Mart, Inc., 101 Ga. App. 163, 112
S.E.2d 793 (1960).
72. See Tyler v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 145 Conn. 655, 145 A.2d 832 (1958)
(5 miles away); City of Greenbelt v. Jaeger, 237 Md. 456, 206 A.2d 694 (1965) (7½ miles
away); Marcus v. Montgomery County Council, 235 Md. 535, 201 A.2d 777 (1964)
(¼ mile away); Lampinski v. Rhode Island Racing &: Athletics Comm'n, 94 R.I. 438,
181 A.2d 438 (1962) (½ mile away).
73. E.g., .Browning v. Bryant, 178 Misc. 576, 34 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem,,
264 App. Div. 777, 34 N.Y.S.2d 729 (1942).
74. E.g., Village of Russell Gardens v. Board of Zoning and Appeals, 30 Misc. 2d
392, 219 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
75. See Kamerman v. LeRoy, 133 Conn. 232,237, 50 A.2d 175, 178 (1946); 2 METZEN•
BAUM, ZONING 1039 (2d ed. 1955); 2 RATHKOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING 40•8 (3d ed. 1956).
76. See Koppel v. City of Fainvay, 189 Kan. 710, 371 P.2d 113 (1962).
77. See Hamelin v. Zoning Bd., 19 Conn. Supp. 445, 117 A.2d 86 (C.P. 1955): Borough
of Leonia v• .Borough of Fort Lee, 56 N.J. Super. 135, 151 A.2d 540 (Super. Ct, App,
Div. 1959).
78. STANDARD Acr § 3.
79. Fewer than ten states lack provisions for zoning regulations in accordance with
a comprehensive plan. See Cunningham, Land-Use Control-The State and Local
Programs, 50 IowA L. REv. 367, 371 (1965).
80. In 1960 almost three quarters of the total population of the United States
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that the impact of zoning is no longer of concern only to the enacting
municipality. 81 Because zoning may have extraterritorial effects, a few
courts have interpreted "comprehensive plan" to permit82 or require 83
the taking into consideration of "regional" 84 factors when zoning
ordinances are enacted. In fact, some states have given their cities
explicit authority to adopt zoning regulations for areas within a
specified distance outside the city limits.85 Consequently, it would
seem that such developments will inevitably lead to the granting of
standing as persons aggrieved to affected nonresidents. A few cases
illustrate the steps which have already been taken toward this goal.
In 1949 the New Jersey Supreme Court held:
[T]he most appropriate use of any particular property depends
not only on all the conditions, physical, .economic and social,
prevailing within the municipality and its needs, present and
reasonably prospective, but also on the nature ·of the entire region in which the municipality is located and the use to which
the land in that region has been pr may be put most advantageously. 86
Subsequently, in Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 81 a
lower New Jersey court held that a borough and its residents had
standing to challenge an adjoining borough's zoning.88 On appeal,
the New Jersey Supreme Court found it unnecessary to. decide the
issue, since a resident of the defendant borough was a party to the
lived in "urban" areas. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
AnsrRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES 15 (86th ed. 1965).
81. See Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REv.
515 (1957); cf. GULICK, THE ME1ROPOLITAN PROBLEM AND AMERICAN IDEAS (1962).
82. See, e.g., Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412, 418 (6th Cir. 1955)
("It is obvious that Valley View, Ohio, on the periphery of a large metropolitan center,
is not such a self-contained community, but only an adventitious fragment of the
economic and social whole"); Gordon v. City of Wheaton, 12 Ill. 2d 284, 146 N.E.2d
37 (1957); Schwartz v. Congregation Powolei Zeduck, 8 Ill. App. 2d 438,441, 131 N.E.2d
785, 786 (App. Div. 1956) ("[I]t is not unreasonable to base zoning regulations for one
municipality upon the conditions or character of an adjoining municipality.").
83. See, e.g., Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d
441 (1954); Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 177-78, 131 A.2d 1, 14
(1957) (dictum); Gartland v. Borough of Maywood, 45 N.J. Super. 1, 6, 131 A.2d 529,
532 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957) (dictum).
84. "Regional" as used here refers to factors inherent in land outside the municipality which must or should be taken into consideration in order to comply with
the requirements of a "comprehensive plan." This is to be distinguished from the type
of regional plan put forth by a "regional planning agency." About one-half of the
states have such agencies.
85. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § Il-13-1 (Smith-Hurd 1962); Petterson v. City
of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956). See also Haar, supra note 81, at
527-29; Melli &: Devoy, Extraterritorial Planning and Urban Growth, 1959 WIS. L. REv.
55.
86. Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, I N.J. 509, 513, 64 A.2d
347, 349-50 (1949).
.
·
87. 28 N.J. Super. 26, 100 A.2d 182 (Super. Ct. L. 1953).
88. Id. at 43, 100 A.2d at 191.
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proceedings. 80 The court pointed out, however, that a municipality
is required to give consideration to "residents and taxpayers of adjoining municipalities who may be adversely affected by proposed zoning
changes." 90 A few years later the implications of this favorable attitude toward nonresident standing were confirmed in another New
Jersey decision in which the court held that the right of a municipality to challenge the zoning of a contiguous municipality "is not
questioned." 91
Connecticut courts have also granted a limited right to protest
the zoning activities of a neighboring municipality. In Hamelin v.
Zoning B·d.,92 residents of the "town" 03 in which the defendant borough was located sought standing to appeal the borough commissioners' orders. The court concluded that those parties who took part in
a zoning hearing were aggrieved persons, even though they were
neither residents nor taxpayers of the borough itself.04
The most liberal extension of nonresident standing in zoning
cases can be found in a recent\',Kansas decision. 05 Under the Kansas
protest statute, a zoning amendment protested by twenty per cent of
the fronting landowners can be passed only by a four-fifths vote of
the city council.96 The Kansas Supreme Court held that nonresident
landowners with land fronting on the area proposed to be altered
should have their protests counted toward the twenty per cent objection requirement. 97 Since this decision allows nonresidents to participate in the enactment of zoning amendments, it would appear a
fortiori that adversely affected nonresidents would have standing as
aggrieved persons to contest the administration of the zoning regulations by the board of adjustment.
C. Business Competitors

It is uniformly held that a person who objects to the grant of a
variance solely on the ground that it will create competition with
89. 15 N.J. 238, 245, 104 A.2d 441,444 (1954).
90. Id. at 247, 104 A.2d at 445.
91. Borough of Leonia v. Borough of Fort Lee, 56 N.J. Super. 135, 139, 151 A.2d
540, 542 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959).
92. 19 Conn. Supp. 445, 117 A.2d 86 (C.P. 1955).
93. A New England town is roughly equivalent to what is known as a township
in other parts of the country. 32 MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 14 (1965).
94. 19 Conn. Supp. at 446, 448, 117 A.2d at 86, 87: "While the plaintiffs are resident
taxpayers of the town, none of them are residents, landowners or taxpayers in the
borough.... We conclude that the plaintiffs who attended the hearing and took part
in the proceedings are entitled to have the orders of the borough commission reviewed."
95. Koppel v. City of Fairway, 189 Kan. 710, 371 P.2d 113 (1962),
96. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-708 (1964).
97. The four-fifths requirement would have come into play in this case only if the
nonresident protests were counted; less than 20% of the resident frontage owners
protested, while 90% of the nonresident frontage owners objected.
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his business is not "aggrieved." 98 An individual cannot be aggrieved
"merely because a variance, even if improvidently granted, will increase competition in (his] business.'' 99 Any injury to the competitor's business stemming from the variance is viewed as damnum
absque injuria. Naturally, a competitor could be "aggrieved" if
he also had an interest, apart from his business interest, that would
be adversely affected. For example, a competitor might own residential property within the zoned area.100 His standing should therefore
be determined by the usual "special damage" inquiry applicable to
other third-party appellants. 1 01
D. Taxpayers
The Standard Act provides that appeals may be taken from the
board to the courts by a person aggrieved or by "any taxpayer.''102
Only seventeen states, however, have retained this language. 103 Although such language would seem to imply that any taxpayer may
appeal without satisfying the requirements for attaining the status
of a "person aggrieved," 104 only a few courts have so held. 105 In most
of the jurisdictions where the language has been retained, the courts
have required the taxpayer to show that he was "aggrieved" in some
manner. 106 In other words, he must generally show special damage
to his property.1 01
98. See McDermott v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 150 Conn. 510, 191 A.2d 551 (1963);
Whitney Theatre Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 150 Conn. 285, 189 A.2d 396 (1963);
Benson v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 129 Conn. 280, 27 A.2d 389 (1942); Ratner v. City
of Richmond, 201 N.E.2d 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 1964); Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board
of Appeal, 324 Mass. 427, 86 N.E.2d 920 (1949); Lampinski v. Rhode Island Racing
&: Athletics Comm'n, 94 R.I. 438, 181 A.2d 438 (1962). But see Jackson's Inc. v. Zoning
Bd. of Appeals, 21 Conn. Supp. 102, 145 A.2d 241 (C.P. 1958).
99. Circle Lounge &: Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeal, 324 Mass. 427, 430, 86 N.E.2d
920, 922 (1949).
100. See, e.g., Farr v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 139 Conn. 577, 95 A.2d 792 (1953).
IOI. See McDermott v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 150 Conn. 510, 191 A.2d 551 (1963);
Bettman v. Michaelis, 27 Misc. 2d 1010, 212 N.Y.S.2d 339 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
102. STANDARD Ac-r § 7. See IowA CODE ANN. § 414.15 (1949); PA. STAT, ANN. tit. 53,
§ 14759 (1957).
103. Krasnowiecki; supra note 64, at 56.
104. See id. at 55-56; Comment, Zoning Variances, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1396, 1400
(1961).
105. E.g., O'Connor v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 65, 98 A.2d 515 (1953);
Mayor v. Byrd, 191 Md. 632, 62 A.2d 588 (1948); Norwood Heights Improvement
Ass'n v. Mayor, 195 Md. I, 72 A.2d I (1950); see Jackson's Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals,
21 Conn. Supp. 102, 106, 145 A.2d 241, 243 (C.P. 1958): "(E]very taxpayer has a certain,
though it may be a small, pecuniary interest in having the ..• law well administered."
Cf. Hamelin v. Zoning Bd., 19 Conn. Supp. 445, 117 A.2d 86 (C.P. 1955).
106. E.g., DeVenne v. City of Lakewood, 95 Ohio L. Abs. 361, 201 N.E.2d 80 (Ct.
App. 1964) (per curiam); see City of Fairfax v. Shanklin, 205 Va. 227, 135 S.E.2d 773
(1964).
107. See Tyler v. Board of ~oning Appeals, 145 Conn. 655, 145 A.2d 832 (1958).
Most acts also allow for appeals by any officer, board, or bureau of the municipality.
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E. Associations
In most jurisdictions a civic, improvement, or property owners'
association cannot qualify as an aggrieved person. 108 Since an association generally does not own property, it cannot meet the "special
damages" requirement, 109 and a mere interest in strict enforcement
of zoning regulations for the benefit of the community or the assoi:;iation has not been considered an adequate substitute for the
showing of special damages.110 Moreover, even where a statute specifically provides that an association or organization may appeal,111
it is not clear that courts will necessarily grant standing. Although
there have been no decisions on the issue, it is likely that such
provisions will be given the same narrow interpretation that has
been given to provisions allowing "any tax.payer" to have standing.
If that is so, an association will be forced to meet the stricter requirements of an ordinary aggrieved person.
III.

CONCLUSION

Zoning regulation must be viewed not only as an instrument of
public policy, but also as a protection, in the long run, against
infringement of individual property rights. In order to harmonize
the twin goals of uniformity and individual diversity, it is important
that persons who have an interest in preserving an established plan
have an opportunity to be heard when use changes are contemplated. For this reason statutory grants of aggrieved party status to
third parties should be liberally construed. Since it is a matter of
standing only, litigation on the merits of the complaint should be
relied upon to expose any frivolous complaints.
At the same time, it is important that "aggrieved party" status
be readily available to persons who apply for permits to change land
STANDARD Acr § 7; S.C. CODE § 47-1014 (1962); VA. CoDE § 15.1-497 (1964). The scope
of these provisions is not discussed in this comment because officials arc not required
to be aggrieved persons as well. Sec, e.g., Dupuis v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 152 Conn,
308, 206 A.2d 422 (1965); Fox: v. Adams, 206 Misc. 236, 132 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Sup, Ct,
1954). A few cases have allowed appeals by the city as an aggrieved party. Sec City of
Mobile v. Lee, 274 Ala. 344, 148 So. 2d 642 (1963); City of Glen Cove v. Buxcnbaum,
17 App. Div. 2d 828, 233 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1962).
108. E.g., Lido Beach Civic Ass'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 13 App. Div. 2d 1030,
217 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1961). But see KY. REv. STAT, ANN, § 100.872 (1962).
109. Norwood Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Mayor, 195 Md. 1, 72 A.2d 1 (1950);
Lindcnwood Improv,::ment Ass'n v. Lawrence, 278 S.W.2d 30 (Mo, Ct, App. 1955);
Feldman v. Nassau Shores Estates, Inc., 12 Misc, 2d 607, 172 N.Y.S.2d 769 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
But cf. Tax:payers' Ass'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 301 N.Y. 215, 93 N.E,2d 645
(1950).
110. See Property Owners Ass'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 2 Misc, 2d 309, 123
N.Y.S.2d 716 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Tyler v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 145 Conn, 655, 145
A.2d 832 (1958). A pet"..on may not become aggrieved merely by assuming "the role
of champion of a community." Blumberg v, Hill, 119 N.Y.S.2d 855, 857 (Sup, Ct, 1953),
111. E.g., KY, REv. STAT, ANN. § 100.872 (1962).
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use. The reasonableness of any denial of a variance can be e_xamined
by the board or the courts, but the requirement of standing should
not be employed to inhibit expression of views. If a person can
demonstrate that he possesses a substantial economic interest in the
outcome of the variance proceeding, he should be accorded standing
for purposes of appeal regardless of the nature of his legal interest
in the affected property.
Alfred V. Boerner

